Law and Bureacracy: The Shroud of Aviation by Flynn, Paul P.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 41 | Issue 1 Article 2
1975
Law and Bureacracy: The Shroud of Aviation
Paul P. Flynn
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul P. Flynn, Law and Bureacracy: The Shroud of Aviation, 41 J. Air L. & Com. 1 (1975)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol41/iss1/2
LAW AND BUREAUCRACY:
THE SHROUD OF AVIATION
PAUL P. FLYNN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A VIATION is now facing a most serious challenge to its newly-
.developed status as the backbone of the transportation system
of the United States. The examination of this threat and its origins
and potential impact, as well as a possible solution, serve as the
focal point for this article. The condition under examination is
called aviation congestion.
Aviation congestion is the result of the interaction of technology,
legislation, regulation, financing, travel demand, flight density,
safety, and the status of the national economy. While a detailed
study of each of these areas could be helpful, it would really be
tangential to the main purpose. A general awareness of these fac-
tors is, nonetheless, necessary to any consideration of the impact
that legislation and regulation have had on the problems of con-
gestion.
Current concern with the problems of congestion seem to rest
substantially on two related but distinct grounds. First is the con-
cern with the effect of congestion on the safety of the passenger;
secondly, there are the joint factors of convenience and necessity.
Concerning necessity, it is noteworthy that in 1950 only one of ten
inter-city common carrier passengers traveled by air, while in 1969
seven out of ten chose air travel.' The volume of airline traffic has
t Paul P. Flynn is a Professor of Law at Southwestern University School
of Law in Los Angeles, California. He received his B.S. from Holy Cross Col-
lege in Worcester, Massachusetts in 1964, his Juris Doctor from Boston College
Law School in 1967, his Master of Laws degree from Southern Methodist Uni-
versity in 1968 and his Doctor of Laws degree from Southern Methodist Uni-
versity in 1973. The basic research on this topic was conducted in partial ful-
fillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Laws.
Hearings on the Administration's Proposal on Aviation User Charges Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 195 (1969).
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exceeded that for rail and bus combined for the last several years,
and a clear preference has been established. Transportation is the
backbone of our economy, and transportation by air is now the
backbone of our common carrier system.'
As early as 1958 the number of aircraft was increasing by leaps
and bounds, with even more rapid growth in their levels of speed.
Until the early 1950's the air traffic control system had placed
heavy emphasis on the "see and be seen" principle, that is, on the
ability of each pilot to see and avoid other aircraft. That principle
has clearly become less and less reliable as both the number and
speed of aircraft increase. The field of aviation has burgeoned so
fast that traffic congestion has rapidly become the major safety
problem for the industry.3
An argument may readily be constructed to support the proposi-
tion that the real issue is not aviation congestion but rather aviga-
tional' confusion. The basic theory would be that, given our cur-
rent technological state, an accident should not occur unless there
were an error in judgment. Such an error would not be attributed
to overcrowded skies, but to confusion as to who was supposed to
do what, and when the action was supposed to have been accom-
plished. We then reach the point of deciding whether congestion
creates confusion, or if confusion creates congestion. It is sufficient
for our purposes, however, to note that the two factors currently
coexist and serve to multiply each other's effects. Our real issue lies
in the fact that relevant statutes, rules, regulations, and procedures
currently in force have not only failed to resolve the problems, but
in some ways have actually added fuel to the fire.
In 1960, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) stated that
the air system was not safe. The organization claimed that inci-
dents involving aircraft subjected to near misses from other aircraft
were not being reported due to the punitive action often taken by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) against the pilots in-
volved.' In 1968, a temporary immunity from prosecution was
initiated by the agency, and the number of near misses reported for
the year jumped from a previous annual average of 500 to over
2Id.
3 104 CONG. REC. 10,178 (1958).
" The term refers to the application of navigational theory and techniques to
aviation. See Flynn, Avigation and the Law, 4 Sw. U.L. REV. 176 (1972).
5 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1960, at 74, col. 5.
A VIA TION CONGESTION
2500.' After careful investigation, the FAA determined that almost
half of the 2500 reports were, in fact, mid-air near collisions with
some degree of hazard to property and life. In a similar analysis of
217 reported near collisions during the period of January through
August of 1964, the FAA reported that 124, or more than half,
were the fault of the Federal air traffic control system.'
The danger inherent in a near miss situation is threefold. First,
collision itself would result in the loss of lives and substantial dam-
age to related property beneath the aircraft. Secondly, there is the
strong possibility of injury to the passengers when the pilot is
forced to take evasive action to avoid collision. Thirdly, the most
subtle injury of all is the factor of pressure, not only on the pilot
and crew, but also on Air Traffic Controllers. While the general
public considers flying to be an essentially safe mode of transporta-
tion, those who are actively charged with the responsibility for the
safety of the passengers on a day-to-day basis must operate under
the ever-present awareness that every day several aircraft will be
exposed to near-miss situations that present some degree of hazard
to the immediate safety of passengers, crew, and citizens in the
cities beneath the aircraft.
In 1958, representatives of the Air Transport Association testi-
fied that airport planning was the most backward part of aviation.!
The airplane was then considered to be ahead of the Air Traffic
Control System by several years, yet the system itself was far ahead
of the airports. The weakest link in the chain of transportation was
the capacity and operation of the airport. ' This condition was
neither surprising nor unexpected. As early as 1936 the airports at
New York, Cleveland, and Chicago were referred to as "danger-
ously congested.""0 In the six-year period from 1926 to 1931, the
number of registered aircraft rose from some 950 to almost 5,000,
the number of passengers from 380,201 to almost two million, and
the number of miles flown from just over 7.5 million to almost 75
million.'1 Continuation of this phenomenal growth in the aviation
N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1969, pt. 11A, at 94, col. 6.
'N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1964, at 76, col. 1.
103 CONG. REC. 6841 (1957).
: 103 CONG. REC. 6840 (1957).
0 80 CONG. REC. 4740 (1936).
1175 CONG. REC. 1176 (1932).
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industry was seen in the mid 1960's when passenger traffic grew on
the average of 40,000 new passengers per day."2
The scope of the problem, then, encompasses not only the air-
ways, where overcrowding can bring collision and death, but also
the airports. John F. Kennedy International Airport is perhaps the
worst example of the congestion resulting, in part, from existing
density and other complicating factors. As early as 1968, traffic
delays of thirty minutes were common, and the director of the
Traffic Control Center hypothesized that within a few years, delays
of two to three hours could be normal." At that time, planes com-
ing into New York were being directed into circling columns or
"stacks" and there were often so many stacks that a plane had to
start circling hundreds of miles away from the airport." Though
traffic into JFK declined seven percent in July of 1968, as com-
pared to July of 1967," the fact remained that air service continued
to exceed airport capacity with the result that congestion delays,
conversions, cancellations and related problems continued to
grow.1
The concern must be broad enough to include the considera-
tion of the total transportation picture. At the same time, real-
istic parameters must be drawn so as to make discussion man-
ageable. In consequence, we shall be primarily concerned with air-
craft and airways, with only secondary consideration of the airports
and the problems of access and egress. In order to place the prob-
lem of congestion in perspective, we may look to studies completed
by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in September of 1969.'
At that time it was found that roughly seventy percent of all en-
planed passengers utilized twenty-two areas and, with the introduc-
tion of noise abatement procedures, the situation at these areas
would become even more acute." The problems of these twenty-two
12 U.S. NEWS & W. REP., Jan. 1, 1968, at 54.
13 Id. at 55.
14 Id.
1" FAA release as cited in N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1968, at 44, col. 1.
16 N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 77, col. 6.
17 CAB, PROBLEMS OF AIRPORT CONGESTION BY 1975 (1969).
1 The 22 areas in the order of their severity are: New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Atlanta, Washington, D.C./Baltimore, San Francisco/Oakland, Dallas/
Fort Worth, Boston, Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Detroit/Ann Arbor, Pittsburgh,
Philadelphia, Denver, Cleveland, St. Louis, Kansas City, Houston, Seattle/Ta-
coma, New Orleans, Cincinnati, Las Vegas, Minneapolis.
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high density areas served as the basis of the CAB report, Problems
of Airport Congestion by 1975.19
Considering potential solutions to the problem, three additional
dimensions must be kept in mind. First, the airlines currently utilize
less than 500 of the nation's 10,000 airports." Secondly, business
travelers estimate that the value of their traveling time equals forty
percent of their wage rate. 1 Thirdly, the profile of the general avia-
tion pilot also has an impact."
Although congestion primarily affects only twenty-two of the ten
thousand airports in this country, it must be remembered that the
impact of this effect is felt throughout the entire system, encom-
passing both private and commercial flight throughout the whole
country. The flight requirements of general aviation pilots, there-
fore, must be balanced by the needs of both the airlines and their
passengers if any effective long-range solution is to be imple-
mented."
Navigation in the air is based upon a series of known "skyroads."
These are technically known as "airways," and are channels in the
air some fifty miles wide that go from one known spot, marked by
a radio beacon, to another similar spot. An aircraft gets from its
point of departure to its destination by following a sequence of
these spot-to-spot references. These spots are marked with ground
based radio beacon stations which transmit a signal on a specific
frequency. This naturally tends to create bottlenecks at major bea-
19 CAB, supra note 17.
" Hearings on Aeronautical Research Before the Subcomm. on Advanced
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 333 (1969). Before this Subcommittee Gen. C. F. von
Kann, V.P. of Operations and Engineering of the Air Transport Association,
testified: "[AIll the airlines in the country use only 500 out of about 10,000
airports."
21 In general, business travelers estimate the value of their traveling time
equals 40% for their wage rate. See Gronau & Reuben, The Effect of Traveling
Time on the Demand for Passenger Airline Transportation, Columbia University
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 1967).
22 N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1968, at 86, col. 1. Most general aviation pilots are
over forty, (54.9%), married (86.3%), earn $15,000 to $20,000 per year, fly
less than one hundred hours per year (51%), and the hours logged are mainly
for pleasure (61%).
'The "solution" currently in vogue creates Terminal Control Areas around
several high use airports. Access to these airports is severely restricted to general
aviation aircraft by regulation and increasingly complex technological require-
ments.
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cons, which result in delays and danger situations. The policy in the
past has been to add more beacons and, hopefully, further disperse
the traffic. This practice, notably in the northeastern United States,
has resulted in a complex of airways which leaves little geographic
area for any further expansion. The limited area available for ex-
pansion produces the phenomenon often referred to as the
"crowded skies." Although prominent in the northeastern United
States, the same or similar situations exist in and around many
large metropolitan areas. The existence of these aviation trans-
portation centers has generally resulted from the reaction of the
airlines and government to passenger needs and desires. The
growth and proliferation has been unplanned, unregulated, and
sporadic.
In addition to the factors mentioned previously, it must be re-
membered that basically a traveler is concerned with getting from
one point to another safely. A secondary concern of the passenger
is speed. He desires to get from one point to another as quickly as
possible, subject to the reasonable requirements of safety. This
represents a long-standing conflict-speed versus safety. There is
little doubt that "speed is the outstanding feature of the airplane
... but safety is the first consideration in time of peace, and speed
must be sacrificed ... insofar as safety makes it necessary."" This
appraisal is as accurate today as when it was originally formulated
in 1922, and has continually played a pre-eminent role in the
resolution of conflicts within the aviation industry.
The late 1960's, however, saw the airlines become primarily con-
cerned with getting an aircraft from one point to another. Although
this concern was justified, it failed to take into account the growing
demand of the consumer, both cargo and passenger. It is of little
use to the consumer to have an aircraft arrive on time if he must
leave his home or business hours in advance of the scheduled flight
time to get to the airport, and then count on even more hours to
reach his actual destination.'
There are numerous entities, both governmental or private, who
have in some manner played a role in the continuing development
of aviation. Local governments have initiated rules, regulations,
2462 CONG. REC. 2008 (1922).
2- Hearings on the Administration's Proposal on Aviation User Charges Be-
fore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 181 (1969).
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and legislation during the earliest days of flight, and now have sub-
stantive control of airport locations, zoning, and related items.
Many state governments have enacted legislation, and the majority
now have state agencies concerned with planning and development
of the aviation industry.
The basic federal regulatory authority at the current time rests
upon the Federal Aviation Act." This Act authorizes and directs
the adoption by the Federal Aviation Agency of air space, air
traffic, and other air safety regulations."7 Provision is also made for
air traffic services and the operation of navigation aids, subject to
available funding. 8 This system, initially established by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, is essentially the same as that now in
operation, and sets the basic air traffic control function as being
the control of all enroute instrument flight rules aircraft, and of all
aircraft operating at or near an airport. The clear carry-over of
the safety concept as the basis for regulation is seen in the Federal
Aviation Regulations, Part I," where air traffic control is defined as
a service operated by appropriate authority to promote the safe,
orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.
As we have seen, congestion is the antithesis of this functional
concept of Air Traffic Control, which is now essentially a federal
responsibility. The problem of congestion as well as the responsi-
bility for responsive action lies with the federal government. One
measure of the effectiveness of its action can be found in aviation
accident reports. One of the most tragic incidents was the collision
of two commercial aircraft over the Grand Canyon in 1956. After
ten months of investigation, the Civil Aeronautics Board listed the
probable cause as the failure of the pilots to see each other in time.
Among the factors which were found to have contributed to the
pilots' lack of ability was the "insufficiency of enroute air traffic
advisory information" and, in conjunction with other listed factors,
the safety board's conclusion represented "an indictment of the air
traffic system as it existed on June 30, 1956.""
21 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
27 104 CONG. REC. 18,326 (1958).
28 Id.
29 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [now 49 U.S.C. §
1301-1542 (1970)].
3 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1975).
1 103 CONG. REC. 15,153 (1957).
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Concern with congestion has not been limited strictly to the area
of safety. Testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee
in 1969 indicated that:
the effect of delays and congestion on the economy of New York
City is already evident. Last year's congestion and problems in that
city, due to inadequacies in the airport/airways system, are esti-
mated to have cost more than $200 million and unless these prob-
lems are corrected, the loss is estimated to reach approximately
$600 million by 1980.'2
Although these figures include the cost of a seven-week shutdown
of domestic airlines in New York which was reported to have
amounted to a loss of over $20 million in retail sales, and a drop of
1,500 rooms per day in the occupancy rate at some thirty-four
hotels,' the potential impact on major cities currently serving as
transportation centers is clear. Tangential results of congestion in-
clude the hesitancy of the public to invest in airline stock, ' as well
as the increase in stolen cargo from $877,000 in 1966 to over $2.3
million in 1967.'
In addition to those factors already enumerated, that of com-
petition must also be accounted for in any serious consideration of
the problems of congestion. Transportation by air has been con-
siderably improved in the last thirty years. The modern aircraft
delivers a passenger-mile-per-hour for roughly one-half the fuel
cost of other means, and transcontinental flights are made in one
quarter of the former time while comfort levels have been substan-
tially improved. 6 Competition in the aviation industry is in reality
at a minimum. Federal regulations have become so pervasive that
virtually every facet of carrier service is subject to control by the
Department of Transportation. At the present time this control is
exercised through the requirement that carriers file tariffs which
specifically delineate all major characteristics of the service they
will perform between the designated points on any flight. Prior to
deviating from any of these specific items, the carrier must file an
32 Hearings on the Administration's Proposal on Aviation User Charges Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 195 (1969).
" N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1969, at S25, col. 1.
34 N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1969, at F2, col. 3.
s N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1969, at 74, col. 1.
6 Smelt, Technical Hopes for the Future of Air Transport, 1969 A.B.A.
PROC., SEC. INS., NEGL., & CoMP. L. 228.
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amended tariff and receive express or implied Federal Aviation
Agency approval.
One positive example of the impact of these problems is the
Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport Complex. This facility was in
the planning and initial construction stage for several years, and
utilizes almost every modem means to maximize efficient and effec-
tive service. The airport is designed with the same number of gate
positions as Kennedy International, but the Texas Airport has the
capacity for substantial expansion built into the initial plan. The
layout of air space, runways, taxiways, and gate positions allows
some 178 operations (takeoffs or landings) per hour, as compared
to a current maximum of ninety used by the Federal Aviation
Agency for Kennedy International." Technologically the airport
problem is capable of solution, as shown by the Dallas/Fort Worth
Complex. The reality of the situation, however, is that most air-
ports are not in a position to expend the amounts of capital in-
volved in the new Dallas regional complex, and in many areas even
if the funds were available, the land is not.
The seeming lack of ability on the part of government to pro-
duce satisfactory results has brought about a strong move on the
part of private industry to move into this field. Special teams, de-
voting substantially all of their time to airport development and
redevelopment, have been formed by many consulting firms. These
groups are comprised of architects, planning consultants with ex-
perience in airport development, and specialists from related disci-
plines. The objective is to be able to handle airport development
from initial planning through final construction and thereby save
time as well as money. 8 The expectation is that the current seven
to ten year lag between initial planning and completion of con-
struction for an airport can be substantially reduced. This should
reduce some of the current lag between technological development
and implementation that often causes facilities to be obsolete be-
fore they are even opened for public utilization.
In considering the difficulties flowing from the factor of cost, we
may begin by noting that Senator Monroney, long heavily involved
in congressional aviation activity, publicly stated for Time maga-
37 N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1969, at 90, col. 2.
" See, e.g., any of the descriptive material concerning the Dallas/Fort Worth
Regional Airport.
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zine after the 1968 congestion crisis, that the airspace system
needed to build some six hundred airports and receive an immedi-
ate fiscal injection of some three billion dollars, with an additional
need for eight billion dollars over the next ten years," in order to
obviate the difficulties currently encountered.
The cost of equipment is in itself indicative of the extent of the
fiscal problems confronting the industry. Federal system expenses
are not small by any means. An indicator to show which way the
wind is blowing costs $3,500 for an airport without an FAA Con-
trol Tower, and $15,000 for an airport that has the "benefit" of a
Federal Control Tower. The small signs indicating a turnoff from
the runway to the taxiway cost $675 each, and an Air Route Traffic
Center (ARTCC) costs $13.6 million."0 In addition to these equip-
ment costs there is the land, which averages one thousand dollars
per acre for rural, ten thousand dollars per acre for suburban, and
one hundred thousand dollars per acre for urban areas. " These
facts should be borne in mind when evaluating previous references
to a potential solution calling for increased concrete at currently
existing commercial airports. We should also note that in the field
of general aviation, the situation is somewhat different in that there
is generally little or no need for most of the equipment just men-
tioned.
The source of financing for the expenses alluded to has been a
policy question which has continually generated considerable fric-
tion. As late as the congressional hearings of 1969, the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), generally accepted as one
of the major spokesmen for general aviation, took the position
"that improvement of air commerce is in the total public interest.
As such, the public interest requirements for air commerce facili-
ties have been, and should be, provided from general revenue
funds."
11TIME, Aug. 2, 1968, at 20.
40 THE AOPA PILOT, Jan. 1972, at 8. There are many additional items avail-
able as examples. For instance, FAA specified runway light bulbs cost $7.00 each
and have an 800 hour lifespan, while at least one state uses bulbs with the same
candlepower which have a life-span of 20,000 hours and cost 67 cents each! See
AOPA NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1973.
"' Id. These are, however, pre-superinflation figures. The current market is
so volatile as to make worthless most cost estimates.
'Hearings on the Administration's Proposal on Aviation User Charges Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 109 (1969).
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With regard to federal support, late 1917 and 1918 witnessed
the industry blossom, when the requirements of national interest
forced the allocation of funds and resources from the federal level
for developmental purposes. The concept of the necessity of subsi-
dizing the industry grew from the meager efforts of the Post Office.
The initial operation of uniform traffic control facilities was gov-
ernmentally controlled in the name of safety and uniformity. This
policy of assistance was adapted to direct subsidization in 1944 by
a Civil Aeronautics Board experiment to determine transportation
needs between smaller communities. This policy developed into a
philosophy of route awards which often failed to make the distinc-
tion between the transportation service needed and the service
performance of the airline." Under such circumstances efficiency
is not necessarily the best policy, and from this basis many current
problems have grown.
February of 1925 saw the enactment of the Kelly Contract Air-
mail Carriage Act" to stimulate passenger service lines. ' In 1934
a new Federal Mail Act went into effect." As provided for in this
act, the President appointed a Federal Aviation Commission which
held hearings in September, October, and November of 1934. The
report resulting from those hearings was filed with the President
and subsequently embodied in proposed legislation," which was
enacted as the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938."8 Many of the pro-
visions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 were not modified by
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and hence, these original provi-
sions still survive to govern the jet aviation industry of today.
The legislative and administrative branches of the federal gov-
ernment have been at variance concerning the need of aviation for
federal financial assistance for some time. In 1959 the Administra-
tion announced opposition to any funding of terminal buildings.'
4 Swaine, Subsidization of Local Air Services, U.C.L.A. (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, 1965). See also N.Y. Times, May 22, 1969, at 86, col. 1.
"Act of Feb. 2, 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805.
475 CONG. REC. 1175 (1932).
4Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. See also State Regulation, 6
J. AIR L. & COM. 428, 429-30 (1935).
4 7 H.R. 5174, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
48 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [now 49 U.S.C.
1301-1542 (1970)1.
"N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1958, at 15, col. 2.
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Subsequently, the legislation authorizing fiscal expenditures for
1961 contained eligibility requirements for airport buildings that
limited the cost of construction to "those buildings or portions
thereof that are required for the safety of craft operating to, from,
and in the vicinity of, the airport ... accordingly.. . only buildings
or portions of buildings required to house . . .Flight Service Sta-
tion, Airport Air Traffic Control Quarters, Combined Air Traffic
Control Tower/Flight Service Stations, Air Weather Bureau .......
are eligible items for federal support." Such limitations substan-
tially reduce the effectiveness of any federal aid. On the other side,
the legislative reference service of the Library of Congress urged
Congress to spend more on aviation safety as a result of a study of
national aviation policies in 1965." At the same time, some fifteen
national trade associations protested administration cuts in various
budgets for improvements," all to no avail. In 1959 the budget
message of President Eisenhower actually advocated the orderly
withdrawal of all federal aid to aviation." Shortly thereafter, the
Federal Aviation administrator recommended an orderly cutback
of the Federal Grant and Aid Program. 4 In 1960 President Eisen-
hower urged an increase in the general aviation fuel tax to pay for
any modernization of the airways and airports that might be
needed.2 The trend was consistently upheld when, in an economy
drive in 1964, President Johnson asked the FAA to close forty-two
inflight service stations." In the face of violent industry opposition,
stations were "consolidated.""7 The result of political pressure com-
bined with the arbitrary evolution of priorities at the highest ad-
ministrative levels have combined to render ineffective the majority
of federal aid programs with regard to airport and airway develop-
ment.
Additional taxes and user charges are the basis for the current
ten-year funding plan incorporated in the Airport and Airways
50107 CONG. REC. 17,964 (1961).
51 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1965, at 64, col. 4.
52 N.Y. Times, May 11, 1965, at 77, col. 6.
53 N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1959, at 70, col. 3.
54 N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1959, at 27, col. 5.
31 Address by President Eisenhower to Congress, Aug. 8, 1959, in N.Y. Times,
Aug. 9, 1960, at 14, col. 7.
51 N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1964, at 14, col. 4.
57 N.Y. Times, May 27, 1964, at 77, col. 6.
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legislation," despite arguments from industry and labor groups
pointing out that ninety-three percent of government financing
comes from general taxation purportedly to provide programs in
the total public interest, and aviation development is in the total
public interest." Nonetheless, the current position of the federal
bureaucracy is that non-military aviation is not sufficiently in the
public interest to warrant expenditures of tax dollars. All costs of
the aviation system are to be recovered from users. The allocation
of recovery amounts to the various segments of the industry is now
a topic of heated discussion. The FAA determines, in its sole dis-
cretion, to install a control tower, at the prices previously outlined,
and then requires all aircraft to use the tower. Those objecting to
the system point out that general aviation has no need for the vast
majority of the sophisticated electronic equipment for which they
will have to pay.
Many of the airport and airways problems stem not only from
unprecedented growth, but also from poor planning and lack of
foresight. The impact of confused federal funding and regulation
has been devastating.
II. LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
Our consideration will now focus upon matters of legislation and
regulation. The initial concern will be with legislation, both State
and Federal. We will then examine regulation, again both State
and Federal, as well as evaluating the interaction between legisla-
tion and regulation. Due in large part to the extensive nature of
legislative and regulatory materials in the field of aviation, it has
been necessary to utilize selective materials geared to raise appro-
priate questions and issues for our consideration.
The first formal state legislation came from Connecticut in
1911 ." The statute, "An Act Concerning the Regulation, Number,
and Use of Airships, and the Licensing of Operators Thereof,"'"
was passed at the insistence of Judge Baldwin, then Governor of
the state. The Judge had first proposed the material to the com-
" Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, § 4, 49 U.S.C. § 1703
(1970).
5" Hearings on the Administration's Proposal on Aviation User Charges Be-
fore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., at 109 (1969).
60CONN. GEN. STAT., ch. 196, § 3107-3117 (1911).
El CoNN. GEN. STAT., ch. 196, § 3107-3117 (1911).
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mittee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the American Bar
Association as a resolution. When it refused to pass the resolution,
he turned to his state legislature."2 The statute provided for absolute
liability of the aviator for any injury suffered by those beneath his
craft, as well as for the licensing of aviators and aircraft.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts followed this lead in
1913, but went further and established the rules of the air in detail
by statute. " In 1919, however, Massachusetts repealed the pre-
sumption-of-negligence provision of its statute, as well as the de-
tailed regulation which had been set out, and created a commission
to promulgate and enforce appropriate regulations. "
In 1927 a number of interested parties in Connecticut, active in
the field of aviation, concluded that more adequate regulation was
essential to the welfare of the industry.' The conclusion was
reached that an independent aviation department would be best
suited to the necessary task. In an action similar to that of Mas-
sachusetts, Connecticut created just such a department." The ra-
tionale behind the need for the creation of such a department was
the fact that the basic regulatory provisions were suffering from a
lack of continuity and uniformity. They were being revised by
each successive legislature, and the administrative responsibility
was being shifted between the Secretary of State and the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles." Not only were Massachusetts and Con-
necticut the first to enact any formal legislation, they were also the
first to begin traveling the road of establishing a specific adminis-
trative body charged by statute with the regulation of all matters
pertaining to aviation.
It must be noted, however, that a considerable quantity of legis-
lation was considered by many states. The general thrust of most of
these acts, however, was to tax the industry, rather than provide
means for the growth and regulation." The general context of state
"
2 See 16 VA. L. REV. 778 (1911).
63 Law of - , 1913, ch. 663, 1913 MASS. GEN. L. (repealed 1919).
"Law of July 12, 1919, ch. 306, 1919 MASS. GEN. L. (repealed 1927).
63 Morris, The Connecticut Program of Aeronautical Regulation and Promo-
tion, 7 J. AIR L. & COM. 56, 58 (1936).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 59.
68 Boutelle, Federal and State Coordination, 6 J. AIR L. & CoM. 492, 493
(1935).
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legislation was not conducive to growth in the industry, and the
recommended state Uniform Act to the contrary,"9 the relation-
ship between the state and federal government was not very clear.
In order to ensure that uniformity would prevail among the
states with regard to the regulation of areas not covered by federal
law, the concept of a Uniform State Regulatory Act was developed.
In 1935 both the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association approved a Uniform Act at their respec-
tive annual meetings.
Various philosophies were represented in different uniform acts.
We see, for example, the years of work by the Committee on Aero-
nautical Law of the American Bar Association finally bearing fruit
in the proposed Uniform Aeronautical Code as well as the Uniform
Airport Act, both of which were to receive widespread acceptance
in the states."0 The availability of so many different "uniform" ap-
proaches to the legislation and regulation in the field of aviation
resulted in duplication, consternation, and confusion. In general,
state legislation prior to 1938 was influenced to a large degree by
the Uniform Aeronautic Act,' while subsequent legislation was in-
fluenced by the suggested model jointly drafted by the National
Association of State Aviation Officials, the Civil Aviation Legis-
lative Council, and the National Institute of Municipal Law
Offices. The failure of any effective leadership from the federal
level resulted in each state weighing and determining, according to
its own intrests, what was the best course of action for the develop-
ment of aviation.
The field of regulation and legislation was becoming so cluttered
that federal action was imperative, not only to provide uniformity,
but to preserve and protect the very safety of the citizens. It seems
clear that the state legislatures were declaring sovereignty over the
air space and all areas not covered by the federal assumption of
control under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution."
The initial attempts at state uniformity via the Uniform Act pro-
61 UNIFORM AERONAUTICAL CODE § 2. See also 2 J. AIR L. & CoM. 252, 253
(1931).
10 The Department of Commerce had already adopted a position encouraging
states to adopt uniform laws as a safety measure. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26,
1929, at 8, col. 3.
71 UNIFORM LAW ANNO. 159. See also note 60 supra.
72 25 AM. J. OF INT. L. -, 99 (1931).
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posals were superseded by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 which
established federal dominance in the field of air safety, traffic rules,
aircraft certification, and airworthiness." This Act did not, how-
ever, affect airport construction, acquisition, or operation except
on a secondary level. At the current time, airport certification is
finally included within the parameters of formal federal dominance
due to various provisions of the Airport and Airways Development
Act of 1970.'
Federal Statutory Basis and Scope
It is necessary to look briefly to the basis, both conceptual and
factual, for federal legislation in order to ensure the maintenance
of realistic perspectives throughout the consideration of this prob-
lem. As early as 1911 three general bases for legislation pertaining
to aerial navigation had been proposed: first, the protection of the
public; second, the protection of the lives and property of indi-
viduals; third, the protection of aviation. ' In seeking to identify
the source of constitutional power which would permit federal
regulation of the airways, four major clauses of the Constitution
were considered."' The commerce clause was ultimately settled
upon as providing the soundest basis for the legislation." There
seemed to be little actual doubt that Congress could provide for
this unification of existing efforts." During these constitutional
considerations, many of the concepts previously discussed were
raised, and the attitude developed that the federal government
needed to provide for the uniform regulation of commercial, civil,
and military aviation,"' rather than simply the unification of then
existing programs. It was due to this broadening of the purpose of
federal legislation that the consideration of the proper constitu-
tional basis gained significant ramifications.
"Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [now 49 U.S.C. 55
1301-1542 (1970)].
7'Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1727
(1970).
71Swift, Present and Proposed Aerial Legislation, 18 CASE & COM. -,
134-37 (1911).
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (War Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (Commerce
Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 and art. I, § 10 (Treaty Making Clause) and
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8 (Admiralty Clause).
7762 CONG. REC. 2006 (1922).
7862 CONG. REc. 2005 (1922).
7'62 CONG. REC. 1998 (1922).
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Several specific effects flowing from federal legislative efforts
over the years are noteworthy at this point. At the time of World
War I, in 1919 and 1920, congressional interest in aviation soared
from near zero to a frenzy. No less than ten pieces of major legisla-
tion were introduced to the House or Senate." Although many of
these were generally similar in nature, their complexity was such
that it was not until May 13, 1926 that the final conference commit-
tee bill was introduced in the Senate.81 As we have seen, the combin-
8
°S. 2593, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919), Secretary of War given power to
regulate all air activities, fix airlines to avoid cities. Referred to the Committee
on Military Affairs. S. 3348, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919), Ref. Committee on
Military Affairs created "Director of Air," who controls all military and civilian
aviation and has power to license and establish rules and routes. S. 2448, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), provides for the establishment of a Bureau of Aeronau-
tics in the Department of Commerce, administered by a Commissioner of Civil
Aeronautics. The Commissioner is given the power, with the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce, to issue regulations having the force of law; to license
pilots and register and license civil aircrafts and airdromes; to establish the con-
ditions under which civil aircraft may be used for transporting persons or prop-
erty; to prohibit navigation over military, naval, and postal areas; and to establish
the rules of traffic applicable to air routes and stations. S. 41, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1926), to establish and regulate the use of aircraft in commerce, and
for other purposes. H.R. 9804, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919), to create a depart-
ment of aeronautics, defining the powers and duties of the director thereof,
providing for the organization, disposition, and administration of a United States
Air Reserve Force, and providing for the development of civil and commercial
aviation; to the Committee on Military Affairs. H.R. 10380, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1919), to create a Department of Aeronautics; to the Committee on Military
Affairs. H.R. 11206, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1919), to create a Department of
Aeronautics, defining the powers and duties of the Director thereof, providing
for the development, production, operation, and maintenance of aircraft, and
providing for the development of civil and commercial aviation; to the Com-
mittee on Military Affairs. H.R. 12134, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920), Depart-
ment of Aeronautics, Director responsible for the production of Government
Aircraft and has control of all Government property connected with aeronautics
and is charged with establishing rules for air navigation, aerial routes, and
licensing. H.R. 13803, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920), Bureau of Air, the Director
has limited control of Government and loose commercial control. H.R. 14601,
66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920), refers to Commissioner representing Departments
of State, Treasury, War, Post Office, Navy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Na-
tional Advisory Commission. The Commission prepares regulations for promul-
gation by the Department of Commerce, controls all U.S. Aircraft Licensing
and inspection of aircraft and fields. The National Advisory Commission was
revised so the Commissioner of Air Navigation in the Department of Commerce
is the administrating agency. H.R. 14137, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920), Bureau
of Aeronautics within the Department of Commerce is managed by the Com-
missioner of Aeronautics and Aeronautics Board, and designates routes, estab-
lishes landing fields, drafts rules and regulations for the board for promulga-
tion by the Secretary of Commerce. (National Advisory Commission is the sub-
stitute for the Aeronautics Board.)
1 67 CONG. REc. 9836 (1926).
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ation of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, the de-
cision to bottom the legislation on the commerce clause, and Presi-
dent Harding's personal preference" managed to produce the Air
Commerce Act of 1926.3
The delay between the introduction of legislation in 1919 and its
ultimate enactment in 1926 was at least due in part to the approach
and attitude of the Harding administration in conjunction with the
inherent difficulty of dealing with such a complex issue at the legis-
lative level. The result was that the legislation, instead of being
timely and providing an assist to the developing industry, was late
and left those who were charged with regulation a great deal of
catching-up to accomplish in order to develop the necessary cap-
abilities."
The 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act' finally discarded a timidity of
Congress regarding federal control of aviation," and assumed com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty in the area. One of the most dis-
tinctive features of the Act was that for the first time the federal
government clearly assumed full responsibility for aviation safety.
8262 CONG. REC. 1998 (1922).
83 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 334, 44 Stat. 568.
84 "The real difficulties in the way of the more complete utilization of aero-
nautics in commerce are not the lack of technical knowledge by which craft can
be built or the ability to fly them, but, rather, the lack of proper conditions
under which to operate such craft. These difficulties may be summarized: First.
The absence of Federal supervision and regulation. Under this head, which is
the crux of the situation, are included the lack of airways throughout the country
properly equipped with landing fields, signaling systems, and regular meteoro-
logical service; the lack of a body of law to govern and control for purposes
of public safety the methods of operation, the issuance of licenses to pilots, and
the inspection of planes. Second. The aloofness of capital from investments in
this field of enterprise. Third. The lack of education on the part of the public
to the advantages of air transportation, coupled with fear of bodily injury." 62
CONG. REC. 1998 (1922) (remarks of Representative Hicks).
I Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [now 49 U.S.C. §$
1301-1542 (1970)].
88 Compare the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 with the Air Commerce Act
of 1926. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat.
1028 amending Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 334, § 6(a), 44 Stat. 572 pro-
vides: "The United States of America is hereby declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space above the United
States, including the air space above those portions of the adjacent marginal high
seas, bays, and lakes over which by International law or treaty or convention,
the United States exercises national jurisdiction. Aircraft a part of the armed
forces of any foreign nation shall not be navigated in the United States, including
the Canal Zone, except in accordance with an authorization granted by the
Secretary of State." See also 12 J. AIR L. & CoM. 361, 364 (1941).
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The legislation was intended to create a framework for safety that
was comprehensive in nature and would extend to all of the social,
economic, political, and national defense implications of aviation."'
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was a compromise which re-
sulted in the merger of the Air Commerce Bureau of the Depart-
ment of Commerce into the newly created Civil Aeronautics
Authority (CAA), with President Roosevelt appointing the per-
sonnel.8" The CAA was charged with making the regulations work.
Theirs was the job of actually inspecting, licensing, and conducting
enforcement activities. In addition, the CAA was given the respon-
sibility of establishing and operating the air traffic facilities neces-
sary to a national airways system."
The Civil Aeronautics Board was the second part of the body, and
was charged with the development of safety standards. These were
to be comprehensive, and include construction of the plane, quali-
fications necessary to fly, maintain, or repair planes, as well as
traffic rules for the air.
The general statutory standards and requirements for air traffic
rules, certificates of registration, compliance and air worthiness for
aircraft, as well as for airmen competency standards, type certifi-
cates, air navigation facilities requirements, and others, were all
retained in the new Act." As a result, neither the states nor their
political subdivisions could constitutionally promulgate aviation
safety regulations," but were primarily restricted to enforcement
87 104 CONG. REC. 10,177 (1958).
88 For news reports of the time, see N.Y. Times, June 6, 1938, at 2, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, June 9, 1938, at 22, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1938, at 3, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, June 14, 1938, at 7, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 17, 1938, at 16, col.
3 (where the Act is summarized); N.Y. Times, June 24, 1938, at 1, col. 6, and
N.Y. Times, July 3, 1938, at 7, col. 2.
"Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). The administrative
structure outlines do not represent the spirit, intent, purpose or provisions of
the 1938 Act which has resulted from twelve years of struggle. The description
is in the most favorable light possible and represents how the operation was
formed within the Department of Commerce as a result of Presidential Reorgani-
zation Plans No. 3 and 4. The potential of the original 1938 Act, as distinguished
from the realities of its operation, are discussed more completely in the conclusion.
"Hester, Civil Aeronautics-The State and the Nation Under the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, 9 J. AIR L. & CoM. 635 (1938).
91 One example is the case of Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132
F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). After several years of litigation an ordinance en-
acted by the village prohibiting flights from 1,000 feet (arriving and departing
from Idlewild therefore precluded) was declared unconstitutional. Where Con-
gress has preempted the field, other powers may be exercised only so long as,
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actions and control of strictly intrastate activities that had no effect
on the uniformity of commerce.
Some of the stated objectives of the 1938 Act include:
(a) the creation of an independent administrative agency
having broad regulatory power over domestic and foreign
transportation as well as other phases of civil aeronautics, in-
cluding the then current functions of the Air Regulation Divi-
sion of the Bureau of Commerce;
(b) provisions for the transfer or merger of the agency with
any agency later established which would control all trans-
portation;
(c) a wide variety of amendments were also made to the
Air Commerce Act of 1926; and
(d) provisions for the codification into one act of all the
essential provisions related to Civil Aeronautics and to repeal
any conflicting laws.9"
In the years immediately preceding the enactment of the Civil
Aeronautics Act there were some fifty-two air traffic control towers
operating independently throughout the country. In accord with
the new federal legislation, provisions were made for the certifica-
tion of the Air Traffic Control facilities, as well as a minimal out-
line of uniform procedures to be employed by the Civil Aeornautics
Authority in the newly-assumed operation of the towers.
The Presidential Reorganization Act of 1939 required, rather
than requested, all Air Traffic Control Towers certified by the
CAA to follow the uniform prescribed procedures. By 1949 the
Civil Aeronautics Administration was actually operating 165 of
the two hundred Control Towers in existence throughout the coun-
try. As regulation has become more complex and required equip-
and to the extent that, they do not invade the area preempted. This area was
held to include the need for national uniformity and therefore regulations must
come from a single body, and that body was not the Village of Cedarhurt, New
York. See also Knouth, Federal Review-Survey of Aeronautical Law in 1954,
21 J. AIR L. & COM. 481 (1954) and Mid-Year Report of the Standing Com-
mittee on Aeronautical Law, American Bar Association, February 1956, 23 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 94, 106 (1956).
92 H.R. 5174, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). See also Act of June 12, 1934,
,ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933 and State Regulation, 6 J. AIR L. & COM. 428, 429-30
(1935).
93Act of Mar. 16, 1939, ch. 11, 53 Stat. 526; Act of Mar. 16, 1939, ch. 11,
53 Stat. 527; Act of Mar. 16, 1939, ch. 11, 53 Stat. 628; Act of Mar. 16, 1939,
,ch. 11, 53 Stat. 931; and Act of Mar. 16, 1939, ch. 11, 53 Stat. 1302.
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ment so expensive, the privately operated towers have now virtually
vanished.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 thoroughly reorganized Fed-
eral regulation and the administrative format, as well as established
the basis for the system now in operation in the United States."
By 1961, several members of Congress were publicly advocating
the enactment of specific legislation to empower the government
to curtail air traffic into areas of high congestion." The final deci-
sion, reached after considerable debate, was that the CAB already
had authority, but that even after nineteen years it had "not laid
out air space patterns except for some of the regular air roads
which commercial lines use. Beyond that, there is no air space
pattern."' Thus, congressional unrest and dissatisfaction were once
more coming to a head only three years after major legislation was
enacted.
Numerous congressional and private reports have, for a variety
of reasons, failed to be fully implemented. As an example, there is
the report of "Special Committee #31, Radio-Technical Commis-
sion for Aeronautics." The Committee's 1948 Report, as endorsed
by the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, was never imple-
mented; in addition, Air Coordinating Committee Special Groups
Five (1950) and Thirteen (1957), the Curtis Committee Report
of 1957, and Project Beacon Task Force (1961) have been only
partially implemented."' Many plans, developmental schemes, and
formats have been proposed over the years only to be rejected in
part or whole; their implementation, even at this late date, could
substantially reduce the dimensions of the currently existing prob-
lems. The overall lack of foresight, when combined with both po-
litical pressure and the lack of consistent development or adminis-
tration, combined to make an already difficult problem almost
unmanageable.
Regulations
The relationship of legal rights and responsibilities between the
numerous parties to the development of aviation has generated
94 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. SS 1301 et. seq. (1970).
95 N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1961, at 52, col. 5.
"6103 CONG. REC. 1465 (1957).
"Air Transport Association, Air Traffic Control System Planning Group.
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volumes of speculation and consideration. There was a distinct
awareness, in the early years, of the frailty of the aviation industry.
This awareness was clearly present in comments which pointed out
that "aerial traffic must not be hampered by a multiplicity of pro-
hibitions of varying stringency which... states shall find it desire-
able to put forth."" Thus, there has been a verbalization of an
awareness of both the practical requirements of aviation and the
necessity for uniformity in treatment, approach, and regulation.
Any attempt at evaluation of the federal regulatory process must
be taken within the framework of the prior discussions concerning
confusion, contrary policy statements, sporadic growth and fund-
ing, and the existence of a major interface between the world of
technology, regulation, and the law. The effectiveness of policy
dvelopment by the agency from 1936 through 1956 is evalated in
the congressional accord for March 2, 1956. There we find that
there is no agency in the United States which has been so afflicted
with the inability to get things done as the CAA . . . It has gone
forward; it has drawn back .... Its policies with respect to naviga-
tional assistance or systems have been uncertain and indefinite.
It has gone forward; declared itself; undeclared itself; returned
99
and generally failed to follow any discernible, consistent pattern
of development. A few years later, in 1958, in the House of Repre-
sentatives, we see that:
government agencies responsible for handling problems in aviation
have failed to treat it as an entire system and consistently have
taken action in part of the system without calculating the effect on
the whole. As a consequence, we are faced with bottlenecks and
conflicts already impairing the capacity of our air transportation
facilities.'1
In addition, "instead of foresight, aggressiveness, and courage in
preparation for the age of transportation by air, the CAA has been
timid, bound to the mistakes of the past, and either unaware of,
or indifferent to, the needs of the future. It has established a woeful
lack of leadership and forward thinking.'.'. The general conclusion
"Myers, The Freedom of the Air, 24 GREEN BAG 430 (1912).
11 102 CONG. REC. 3829 (1956).
110 104 CONG. REC. 18,323 (1958).
101 Id.
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reached was that "the crying need today is not for another huge
sum for the CAA to mismanage as in the past. It is for the Con-
gress to insist on better preparatory planning for airports as a part
of the new jet airways system..' 1. The realization of the coordination
and scientific-legal interface required to fulfill the mandate should
caution all but the most optimistic to view the potential for success
with a high degree of constructive skepticism.
The need for coordination and cooperation between the regula-
tory and operational branches of the federal government should
be self-evident. In the course of Congressional hearings during
September of 1956, however, the acting administrator of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration informed the subcommittee that he
and the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board "had agreed to
make a study of regulatory problems involved in the delegation of
rule-making authority to the CAA."'3 The committee was of the
opinion that this was an important step in the improvement of
relations between the two branches. Thus, after eighteen years of
mutual co-existence, the two divisions began taking steps at least
to study the problem of their relationship and its effect on the
aviation industry.
In terms of evaluation, it seems clear that federal efforts in the
field of regulation over the pasty forty-seven years have left some-
thing to be desired. The various federal agencies, layers of respon-
sibility and authority, have been planted, grown mature and borne
fruit, all with little or no comprehensive or cohesive plan to act
as any kind of framework for this development, or as a guideline
by which progress could have been measured. The result has been
almost unbelievable confusion, competition and lack of leadership
over the years.
The regulatory process can be an effective method of dealing
with situations that are subject to change, such as the aviation in-
dustry. As a positive example, we may look to the generous route
awards made by the CAB in the late 1960's. At that time the
agency did not foresee the tight market and failing revenue situa-
tion which would face the airlines. The result was that some lines
were seriously overextended, and the agency then decided to take a
somewhat favorable attitude towards mergers, as well as to allow
"o 104 CONG. REC. 18,327 (1958).
"
3 CONG. REC. 10,707 (1956).
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some carriers to cut back on their services to small, unprofitable
cities.'" The major difficulty with regulations is not their existence,
or the existence of regulatory power, but seems rather to lie in the
persistently complex approach that so often characterizes the im-
plementation of 'flexible' policies. As one example, it is noteworthy
that a conclusion widely drawn from the results of the Air Traffic
Controller slow-down operation was that the multiple safety rules
and regulations enacted by the federal government actually result-
ed in confusion, and even with the need to prevent accidents, that
there must be a simpler approach.'"
In terms of the impact of congestion on travel, we see the Inter-
national Air Transport Association pointing to New York as, "the
world's biggest airport headache because of congestion and [they]
declare that unless something is done, the airlines are going else-
where, to Boston, Washington, Baltimore, or anywhere else.""'
As a further indication, we see that in 1969 Pan American Air-
ways filed a formal request with the Civil Aeronautics Board to
operate flights to Europe directly from Bradley International Field
in Connecticut. The airline cited New York congestion in support
of its request, and claimed increased operating costs of $590,000
in the last two weeks of July that were ". . . directly attributable
to delays caused by congestion at New York.'
07
As a further example of the current results of forty-seven years
of government regulation, we look to the findings of Congress as
embodied in the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970
where, we see that:
Congress hereby finds and declares-that the Nation's airport and
airway system is inadequate to meet the current and projected
growth in aviation. That substantial expansion and improvement
of the airway and airway system is required to meet the demands
of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the national de-
fense.'
Thus, the existing 'Gordian Knot' of rules and regulations that
have been implemented, and are currently enforced by the federal
104 Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1971, at 16, col. 6.
101 U.S. NEWS REPORT, July 29, 1968, at 6.
101 N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1968, at 10, col. -.
107N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1969, at 77, col. 2.
"I Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, § 4, 49 U.S.C. S 1703
(1970).
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government, no longer serve the purpose of their creators-to
maximize and foster the safe, efficient utilization of the air space
of the United States. Complexity is most heavily seen where the
government has chosen, or attempted, to regulate all details of an
operation, or in fact has assumed the very operation itself. One
primary example of this assumption lies in the field of Air Traffic
Control operations. This glaring exception to the original intent
and policy of regulation-not operation, has colored the entire
federal relationship with aviation over the years. In all of our dis-
cussions concerning legislation, regulation, and the industry, there
has been no evaluation of the appropriateness of federal operation
in this sole facet of aviation. The problems we have discussed, how-
ever, all relate, in varying degrees to the Air Traffic Control Sys-
tem. The lack of any substantive review of the basic issue of fed-
eral regulation versus federal operation, is considered critical in
the failure of government to resolve the underlying problems of
congestion.
III. RESOLUTION
The problems which we have had under consideration to this
point are not expected to disappear in the immediate future. In
fact, the Federal Aviation Administration in its ten-year forecast,'0
predicts more of everything-more aircraft,"' more passengers,'11
more regulations, and increased complexity as well as new prob-
lems. In addition to economic factors and rising cost, the FAA
itemizes airport and ground transportation, and severe congestion,
as the factors that will operate as restraints on the further develop-
ment of the growth of the air transportation system."' FAA spokes-
men identified the mix of high and low speed traffic; the mixture
109 FAA's Ten-Year Forecast, AIR LINE PILOT, June 1972, at 6 et. seq. This
article condenses the major points of interest to our discussion. The complete
original document, in three volumes, was issued by the Department of Trans-
portation, Federal Aviation Agency Forecast, 1972-1982 (1972).
"" Commercial aircraft movements handled by FAA traffic control centers
will rise from 13 million to 15.6 million in 1982 and general aviation movements
of the same type will rise from 3.7 million to 18.3 million per year. See FAA's
Ten-Year Forecast, AIR LINE PILOT, June, 1972, at 6.
"' Commercial passenger traffic reached 170 million enplanements in 1972,
and by 1982 this is projected to reach 500 million enplanements per year. In
addition, passenger revenue miles will go from 132.4 billion to 397.2 billion by
1982. See note 109 supra.
"I Supra note 109.
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of Instrument Flight Rates and Visual Flight Rules operations; as
well as the increased volume of traffic in an already congested air-
space as the operational problems whose solution is critical to the
continued development of the aviation industry."'
Historically, the field of aviation has been distinguished from
other developing areas of law. While many fields develop in a two-
dimensional framework through a combination of judicial deci-
sions and statutory enactments, there is a substantial third dimen-
sion to aviation. This is the development of law by regulation.
This third dimension has the statutory enactment as its foundation,
but it is the regulatory provision rather than the legislation which
constitutes the real body of effective law. Although there was some
initial doubt, the power of the Secretary of Commerce to not only
regulate interstate commercial flying but to establish rules and
regulations pertaining to all flying were judicially settled quickly." '
Thus, this third dimension has continually assumed greater import-
ance over the years, and although the early impact of the judiciary
was limited, it was an essential part of the creation of a climate in
which the industry could, and did, survive.
In general, any administrative resolution of the problems relat-
ing to congestion would have to be implemented from the federal
level. As we have consistently noted, this leadership has not been
exercised in the last fifty years and there is little to indicate a sud-
den reversal of this trend.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In review we see that many of the issues raised by the problem
of congestion result from the interface of technology, law and regu-
lations. One underlying problem which has continually brought
distress to all segments of the industry is that of accurately predict-
ing the growth of the industry. The problem involves two interact-
ing phases; first, airline passenger miles have been growing, and
technological advances have been providing larger, more powerful
planes to accommodate this increase. Secondly, airport construc-
tion involves a span of seven to ten years and facilities now being
completed were designed for a past generation of aircraft some ten
"'Supra note 110.
"'For a full discussion, See Documents: State Regulation, 2 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 545, 556 (1931).
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years ago. The technology of the industry has outstripped the fore-
sight of the airport planners."' The gap in the early 1920's between
the advance of science and the effective utilization of these ad-
vances continued to widen over the years, and there grew up a re-
liance on written regulations to the detriment of implementing the
products of hard science. In general, a "failure to forecast accur-
ately the growth of air traffic and to anticipate the airways/airport
system's inadequacy for handling traffic demand in key metro-
politan areas has resulted in increasing congestion." The situation
inflicts hardships on the traveling public, financial losses on the air
carriers, and constraint on the economic growth of the surrounding
communities." '
The lack of legislative action prior to 1926 led directly to gen-
eral disorganization, lack of leadership and an undesirably high
risk factor for potential investors. When the immediate and press-
ing need for self-preservation so dictated, sufficient priorities were
created to render necessary assistance to aviation. Immediately
upon the cessation of that need in 1919-1920, this assistance
ceased. The infusion of equipment and personnel generated the first
federal legislation. It was, however, some fifteen years after the
first state action, and was directed primarily to the issues of taxa-
tion and safety. At that time the situation reached the point where
"the need for an air law is so pressing that its method of adminis-
tration is a secondary consideration......
Federal regulation was a necessary cornerstone for the full de-
velopment of aviation."' In 1921, President Harding added a new
dimension when he stated that, "the encouragement of the civil
development of aeronautics is especially desirable as relieving the
government largely of the expense of development and maintenance
of an industry now almost entirely borne by the government
through appropriations for the military, naval, and postal air serv-
ices."'' 1' This attitude on the part of the executive branch of govern-
"' N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1968, at 61, col. 1.
116 The Air Transport Association of America, Air Traffic Control System
Planning Group, final report as cited in Hearings on Aeronautical Research Be-
for the Subcom. on Advanced Research and Technology of the House Comm.
on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 245-312 (1969).
11762 CONG. REC. 2008 (1922).
11862 CONG. REC. 2002 (1922).
119 62 CONG. REC. 1997 (1922).
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ment continued throughout the development of aviation up to and
including the current time.
The 1926 Act had created the Bureau of Air Commerce within
the Department of Commerce. This effectively placed the regula-
tion and control of commercial aviation, as well as private aviation
activities, within the executive branch of the government. In the
late 1930's, testimony of the Superintendent of Maintenance for
the Bureau of Air Commerce revealed that the entire system of
navigational aids to aviation was then operating at approximately
fifty-five percent efficiency, whereas with proper maintenance and
uniform procedure, which had not been utilized in prior years, the
system could operate at a ninety-eight percent efficiency rating.
The mechanical technology had progressed to a point where flying
could have been comparatively safe,' but the procedural tech-
niques of administration had allowed the system to grow inefficient,
inaccurate, unsafe, and much more expensive than was necessary.
The Congress, reacting to the scandal and the safety needs of
the public, subsequently enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938. In a real sense the 1938 Act can be considered the Magna
Carta of aviation. Instead of several agencies involved in the regu-
lation of aviation, there was created a single tripartite agency.
There was a five-man Civil Aeronautics Authority responsible for
safety and economic regulations, a three-man Air Safety Board
responsible for the investigation of accidents, and an Administra-
tor responsible for the general development and operation of air
navigation facilities as well as promotional activities.' Presidential
Reorganization Plans, however, substantially altered the original
act without changes being made in the underlying legislation. The
net result of Presidential Reorganizational Plan Number Three
was to move the position of Administrator of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority into the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, thus
consolidating two of the three divisions. Plan Number Four abol-
ished the Air Safety Board and transferred its functions to the
Civil Aeronautics Authority so there was, in effect, one body. The
name of the authority was changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board,
and with all functions and responsibilities, this body was made a
120 Supra notes 82 and 84.
" Lindsey, The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation 1938-1958, 28
J. AIR L. & COM. 18 (1961).
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unit of the Department of Commerce. The presidential action re-
suited in recreating a substantially similar administrative organiza-
tion, as if the 1938 Act had not been substantially revised into
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,12' but had merely consolidated
the aviation activities into one scandal-ridden and politically sen-
sitive Department of Commerce. These actions were taken in the
face of strong opposition from all parts of the industry and private
aviation organizations."'
The Congressional Record for July 8, 1956, points out that
"the rules governing air traffic are frequently revised to keep them
up-to-date, but the system from which they stem, together with
much of the equipment on which control is based, was established
in the 1930's.''" In the time since 1958, there have been sig-
nificant strides made in the area of technological development
potentially applicable to the aviation industry. There has, how-
ever, been little or no overall pattern to this progress.
From the private sector, a general framework for public regu-
lation was presented to Congress in 1922. The proposal was broad
in scope but emphasized that the most desirable approach would
be to delegate rule-making powers to an agency rather than legis-
lating the details of such items as "rules of the airways." The un-
derlying bases for the suggested model were the International Air
and Navigation conventions and the British regulations already
in existence."
122 Id. Only slight changes were made to accommodate war-time needs, i.e.,
increasing the number of flying hours allowable on a monthly basis from 85 to
100 (Act of Apr. 20, 1942, ch. 266, 56 Stat. 265, amending Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, ch. 601, S 401, 52 Stat. 987). Action in 1946 permitted better in-
ternational collaboration with regard to meteorology (Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch.
911, 60 Stat. 944, amending Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 803, 52
Stat. 1014). The 80th Congress also authorized an Air Traffic Controller training
program and subsequently authorized transfer of powers from the CAB and Air
Safety Board to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator.
123 The attitude of many congressional leaders in the struggle to establish a
viable solution to the aviation problems is indicated by 102 CONG. REc. 3828
(1956) (Remarks of Senator Monroney). We are fighting a system under which
civil aeronautics, with its great and dynamic possibilities, is the captive of an
agency which is concerned with weather reports, the merchant marine, weights
and standards, and general, ordinary manufacturing business methods, to the
point where aviation has been and continues to be, with increasing acceleration,
a disenfranchised satellite of a rather cruel and inefficient stepmother in the
Department of Commerce.
114102 CONG. REC. 11,897 (1956).
125 The regulatory portion of the proposal stated that any regulatory code be
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During the period, 1919-1920, there were a wide variety of
articles clearly and convincingly making a case for federal regu-
lation on the grounds of safety, promotion of the industry, uni-
formity, and absolute necessity."
With respect to the effective control of air navigation, we see
that as early as 1911
local laws and the exercise of the police power may be found
sufficient to protect the public at large against reckless experiments
over their heads. But it is certain that, if air navigation becomes
extensive enough to require rules and regulations to govern it, that
regulation will be the business of the Federal government." 7
The results are less than satisfactory. We see the existing con-
cern in a statement to the House Committee on Ways and Means
during the 1969 congestion hearings, where the spokesman for
the Airport Operators Council International (AOCI) emphasized
that "airport capacity, airways capacity, and ground access .. .
must develop simultaneously; the air traveler is interested in total
elapsed time from his home or office to his ultimate destination
and not merely from airport to airport."'"
It is the conclusion of this author that the nature of the prob-
lems faced have changed substantively as well as substantially
while the efforts at regulation have failed. The key to the solution
concerned with occupants of the surface. Registration, marking of machines,
inspection and certificates of airworthiness, as well as compulsory examination
and licensing of pilots and the restriction of exhibition or trick flying over densely
populated areas must be included. Authority to promulgate regulations should
be vested in Federal and State officers to preserve the necessary flexibility in
the industry. Regulations laying down 'rules of the air,' corresponding to the
'rules of the road' for automobiles; fixing standard methods of landing and de-
parture; mapping out airways so as to promote safety in flight and to avoid con-
gestion of aerial traffic over thickly settled districts; and regulating landing fields
and aerodromes. "[T]he statute might well confine itself to a designation of
the subjects to be regulated and the objects to be sought by such a regulation."
62 CONG. REC. 2005 (1922).
12 8 FLYING, Feb. 1919, at 149; AERIAL AGE, Nov. 8, 1920, at 248; 10 AvIA-
TION, Jan. 3, 1921, at 22 and 120; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 1919, at 484; and 6
A.B.A.J. 42 (1920).
12 Rich, Federal Control Over Air Navigation, 17 CASE & COM. -, 288-89
(1911).
'2s Hearings on H.R. 12374 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at 184 (1969). In a similar vein, the Presidential message to
Congress which accompanied the transmittal of the Airport and Airways De-
velopment Act on June 16, 1969, pointed out that "[a] plane travels from airport
to airport, but a person travels from door to door."
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of the current problem seems to lie in solving the problems of the
Air Traffic Control System. A more direct approach, which re-
flects an awareness of the relations and ramifications of the fed-
eral-space-industry complex should be effective in producing both
short-term relief and long-term solutions to the problems of avia-
tion.
In this context, the separation of the operation of the air
traffic control function from the government would seem to be
an integral and essential factor in providing an overall solution.
Appropriate federal legislation could meet many of the aviation
needs we have seen consistently demonstrated."' The end result
of such legislation would be the creation of a quasi-public cor-
porate entity whose sole purpose would be the operation of the
Air Traffic Control System. The new corporation, formed by
government, industry, and private investors would be in a posi-
tion to implement the current federal desire to be relieved of
financial cost in the operation of the Air Traffic Control System,
while being more responsive to the previously stated needs of the
industry and users of the system.
On a secondary level, this new corporation would be respon-
sible for submitting a national airport and airways development
plan to the Federal Aviation Agency and Congress every two
years. The financing of any such corporate venture is not with-
out precedent. 3° The combination of public participation through
common stock, combined with the realistic user charge system for
necessary services rendered, and the allocation of federal sup-
port by placing the management of the Airport and Airways De-
velopment Act Trust Fund in the hands of the corporation, would
provide more than a sufficient financial base.
In many ways, a simplistic analogy to the current approach to
automotive safety is in order. In this latter area we see the com-
plexity of the problem being resolved by the drafting of safety
and ecological standards, and the concurrent requirement that
the industry meet these requirements by a certain deadline. The
design and development of solutions are left to private enterprise.
The government does not enter into the operation of making
129 See Appendix A for a brief outline of a draft statute to implement the
suggested solution.
10 N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1966, at 14, col. 2.
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automobiles, and should not operate the Air Traffic Control
System.
Governmental agencies could direct their expertise and fund-
ing expenditures to the simplification and recodification of regu-
latory provisions. The corporate efforts could be initially directed
at the establishment of a user fee system based upon realistic cost
figures... for necessary services in accordance with governmental
regulations. The streamlining of Air Traffic Control operations"s
and the implementation of available technological methods could
provide short term relief while paving the way for the development
of a responsive, effective and efficient aviation system that is really
safe.
This would result in the alleviation of current pressure on the
Federal Aviation Agency, which must operate within the frame-
work of the governmental bureaucratic structure. It also would
serve to stimulate government to fulfill a truly regulatory role and
diminish the current dissipation of energy and resources that the
current operation of the Air Traffic Control System requires.
l"I Levine, Landing Fees and the Airport Congestion Problem, 12 J. LAw &
EcON. 79 (1969).
"32 1974 FAA Budget Item, (Approved by the House Appropriations Sub-
Committee). Automatic window washers for 10 FAA towers $407,000.00. Agency
difficulty in getting people to wash windows leads to an expenditure of over
$40,000 per tower. It should be expected that a corporation, being business ori-
ented rather than bureaucratically entrenched, would be unlikely to spend monies
needed for safety programs and technological research in such a manner.
